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INTRODUCTION

A number of recent federal court opinions,1 including a decision by the
United States Supreme Court, have denied plans falling under the
Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 ("ERISA) 2 the
opportunity to seek reimbursement for medical expenses paid for plan
members.' Without delving into the weighty policy considerations that
support these decisions, the courts rendering these decisions have
constrained their analyses to simple statutory construction of the
relevant provisions of ERISA. As a result, these decisions might appear
to be hyper-technical on the surface. However, significant policy
considerations underlie the results. This Article will explore the policy
considerations that support the notion that reimbursement should be
denied to ERISA plans. As suggested in the title to this Article, one does
not have to go far to find them; they are as significant and as obvious as
an elephant would be in the courtroom; an elephant that exists but is
not acknowledged. This Article will also address opposing considerations, which are urged in support of reimbursement.
Given that these decisions reach the right result, the reader might
question the need for this Article. Why write an article that "supports"
these decisions? The answer is simple. The law is far from settled. The
leading case in this area, Great-West Life & Annuity Insurance Co. v.
Knudson,4 was decided by the United States Supreme Court and leaves
many unanswered questions. Litigation over reimbursement abounds.
Furthermore, a few federal courts have established new reasons to
permit reimbursement.5 As this intense struggle continues in our
judicial system, the time has come for the courts to look directly at the
significant policy considerations at hand.

I have previously published two articles which address the issues associated with the
extension of subrogation into the arena of personal injury claims. This Article addresses
related aspects of these same issues as they are now found to exist in the context of health
insurance offered by ERISA plans. In that regard, this Article tends to "pick up" where the
earlier articles have "left off." My previously published articles, which serve as the
foundation for this Article, will be found cited in some of the footnotes to this Article.
1. These cases are cited and discussed immediately below in the text and footnotes.
2. 29 U.S.C. § 1001-1461 (2003).
3. The denials also extend to commercial insurers having agreements with these plans.
4. 534 U.S. 204 (2002).
5. For cases discussing the "possession theory," see infra notes 90-94 and accompanying
text.
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This Article will demonstrate that the public policy considerations that
warrant denial of reimbursement are deeply rooted in equity and in
common law. Furthermore, these historical considerations remain intact
because ERISA itself neither permits nor endorses the concept of
reimbursement. To the contrary, the declaration of congressional policy
found in ERISA suggests that the scheme was designed to assure an
"equitable character of such plans" for the benefit of "the interests of
employees and their beneficiaries."6 Against the historical background
that existed at the time ERISA was enacted, Congress has indicated that
the goal of full and just compensation for employees and their beneficiaries should carry a higher priority than the goal of strictly upholding
plan documents as unilaterally drafted and amended by ERISA plans.
This Article will also address the related assertion by ERISA plans
and their insurers that without reimbursement, plan funds are drained,
which adversely and significantly impacts rates. This Article will also
address the argument that without reimbursement, the insured receives
a "windfall-an argument which still occasionally arises. The sad fact
in the vast majority of these critical injury cases is that the insured is
left not only seriously impaired for life, but, if reimbursement is
permitted, the insured is also left financially destitute.

II.
A.

EXISTING FEDERAL DECISIONS DENYING REIMBURSEMENT

Knudson, The Point of Beginning

The chronological point of beginning lies in the decisional law of the
United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit.7 The most
appropriate place to begin this discussion, however, is with the United
States Supreme Court decision in Great-West Life & Annuity Insurance
Co. v. Knudson,' which was decided on January 8, 2002. This case
arose in California and was just one of many cases in which the Ninth
Circuit simply followed its well-established rule in cases of this nature.9
Janette Knudson was injured in a car accident and rendered a
quadriplegic. The ERISA plan paid $411,157.11 of her medical expenses.
Actually, the plan covered $75,000 of the expenses, and the remainder

6. 29 U.S.C. § 1001(a) (2000). This is discussed more fully in infra notes 130-31.
7. FMC Med. Plan v. Owens, 122 F.3d 1258 (9th Cir. 1997). See generally Lisa M.
Bleed, Enforcing SubrogationProvisions as "AppropriateEquitable Relief under ERISA
Section 502(a)(3), 35 U.S.F. L. REV. 727, 736-39 (2001).
8. 534 U.S. 204.
9. Bleed, supra note 7, at 738 n.83.
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was paid by Great-West Life & Annuity Insurance Company pursuant
to its "stop-loss" agreement maintained with the plan. Knudson sued
the manufacturer of the car in which she was riding and other alleged
tortfeasors in California state court. A settlement of $650,000 was
negotiated. Proceeds were allocated as follows: $373,426 for attorney
fees and costs; $256,745.30 to a Special Needs Trust, which under
California law exists to provide for continuing medical care for Knudson;
$5000 to the California state Medicaid program; and $13,828.70 for
reimbursement to the ERISA plan and supporting insurer. Eventually
Great-West filed suit in federal court in California seeking injunctive
and declaratory relief asking that the "reimbursement" provision of the
plan be enforced and that Knudson be required to pay the entire
$411,157.11 to the plan and to Great-West.' ° Jurisdiction had been
predicated upon § 502(a)(3) of ERISA, which provides as follows:
(a)... A civil action may be brought(3) by a participant, beneficiary, or fiduciary
(A) to enjoin any act or practice which violates ... the terms of
the plan, or
(B) to obtain other appropriate equitable relief
(i) to redress such violations or
(ii) to enforce any provisions of ... the terms of the plan."
Existing case law in the Ninth Circuit had established that an action
seeking a judicial decree of reimbursement was not "equitable" relief
under this statutory provision and that such an action was, therefore,
not authorized by ERISA.' 2 Both the federal trial court and the Ninth
Circuit held that relief could not be granted to the plan. 3
The Supreme Court affirmed the Ninth Circuit."4 Four justices
dissented. 5 The majority opinion by Justice Scalia construed the
ERISA provisions narrowly, restating the Court's view that "'strong
evidence [exists] that Congress did not intend to authorize other
remedies that it simply forgot to incorporate expressly.'"' 6 The Court

10. 534 U.S. at 208.
11. Section 502(a)(3) of ERISA, codified at 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(3) (2000).
12. See supra note 7 and accompanying text.
13. 534 U.S. at 208.
14. Id.
15. Id. at 221 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). Justice Ginsburg wrote a dissenting opinion
in which Justices Stevens, Souter, and Breyer joined. Id. at 224 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
Justice Stevens also wrote a brief dissenting opinion, in addition to joining with Justice
Ginsburg. Id. at 221-22 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
16. Id. at 209 (quoting Mertens v. Hewitt Assocs., 508 U.S. 248, 254 (1993)).
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recognized that Knudson was, in essence, simply a suit for personal
liability-a suit for money damages. 7 The Court also rejected various
arguments seeking to characterize the relief sought as "injunctive"" or
as some other form of "equitable relief,"' 9 stating,
The basis for petitioners' claim is ... that petitioners are contractually
entitled to some funds for benefits that they conferred. The kind of
restitution that petitioners seek, therefore, is not equitable-the
imposition of a constructive trust or equitable lien on particular
property-but legal-the imposition of personal liability for the benefits
that they conferred upon respondents.2"
The opinion's effect is to deny reimbursement simply because such a
suit is not authorized by the provisions of ERISA, not because reimbursement is unlawful or would violate public policy considerations. Of
course, the end result was that allocation of the settlement proceeds for
Janette Knudson was not disturbed. All of the money allocated under
the settlement to the Special Needs Trust for Janette Knudson remained
intact. Nor was there any disturbance in the payment of attorney fees
and costs."
On the other hand, had reimbursement been permitted, nothing would
be left from the $650,000 settlement for Janette Knudson, a quadriplegic
victim. All of the funds would be expended for reimbursement to the
ERISA plan, attorney fees, and costs.
The Supreme Court's entire resolution of this case hinged on the
statutory language found in ERISA, whether the suit was "equitable,"22
and whether the plan was authorized to bring this sort of suit by the
ERISA statute. 23 The Court did not discuss the appropriateness of
allowing reimbursement. Nor did the Court mention the significant
public policy considerations that support the proposition that reimbursement, in a situation like this, should be denied as a matter of law.
According to the Knudson majority, whether reimbursement would be
available in other cases remains an open question:

17. Id. at 210.
18. Id.
19. Id. at 212.
20. Id. at 214.
21. Id.
22. The Knudson decision falls in line with the previous recognition by the Court that
"'"equitable" relief must mean something less than all relief.'" Id. at 209 (quoting Mertens,
508 U.S. at 258 n.8 (1993)).
23. Id.

600

MERCER LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 55

We note, though it is not necessary to our decision, that there may
have been other means for petitioners to obtain the essentially legal
relief that they seek. We express no opinion as to whether petitioners
could have intervened in the state-court action brought by the respondents or whether a direct action by petitioners against respondents
asserting state-law claims such as breach of contract would have been
pre-empted by ERISA. Nor do we decide whether petitioners could
have obtained equitable relief against respondents' attorney and the
trustee of the Special Needs Trust, since petitioners did not appeal the
District Court's denial of their motion to amend their complaint to add
these individuals as codefendants. 2
This concession by the majority might appear beneficial for plans
seeking reimbursement in subsequent cases, but the dissenting opinion
by Justice Ginsburg aptly puts things in perspective by pointing out that
the procedural history in this case shows that the plan and its insurer
were out-maneuvered in the interplay between state court and federal
court orders.2" Justice Ginsburg's dissent reveals that the majority
opinion was indeed more preclusive than suggested:
After today, ERISA plans and fiduciaries unable to fit their suits
within the confines the Court's opinion constructs are barred from a
federal forum; they may seek enforcement of reimbursement provisions
like the one here at issue only in state court. Many such suits may be
precluded by antisubrogation laws [and] others may be preempted by
26
ERISA itself.
Thus, the stage was set for future litigation. Was the Court's denial of
a federal remedy for reimbursement under § 502(a)(3)(A) of ERISA a
complete foreclosure of the reimbursement effort by ERISA plans? Or,

24. Id. at 220.
25. Id. at 226-27 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
Great-West named the Knudsons as defendants before Janette Knudson's Special
Needs Trust had been approved. There was no other defendant then in the
picture. Seeking at that time to preserve the status quo, Great-West requested
from the District Court preliminary injunctive relief to stop the Knudsons from
disposing of the funds Hyundai paid to settle the state-court action. Only after
the District Court denied that relief did the state court approve of, and order that
the settlement funds be paid into, the Special Needs Trust. Great-West then
moved for leave to amend its complaint to add the trustee as a defendant, but the
District Court denied that motion without consideration in light of its judgment
for the Knudsons on the merits.
Id. (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
26. Id. at 227 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
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could the matter of reimbursement be successfully pursued by an ERISA
plan if it were to arise in a different posture?
In regard to the significant underlying policy considerations, the
dissenting opinions by Justices Stevens and Ginsburg are equally void
of any discussion of the appropriateness of reimbursement. The focus of
Justice Ginsburg's dissent 7 was almost entirely upon whether the
"nature of the relief' sought is authorized by the ERISA statute.28
Justice Stevens's additional solo dissenting opinion stated, "It is difficult
for me to understand why Congress would not have wanted to provide
a recourse in federal court for the plan violation disclosed by the record
in this case."29 If any "policy" ingredient exists in the dissenting
opinions, it seems to be as Justice Stevens suggests-that there is a plan
document, the plan document requires reimbursement, and the plan
document has been violated.3 ° It does not seem to matter to Justice
Stevens that the plan document might contain provisions that violate
public policy or are otherwise unlawful.3 '
B. The Preemptive Nature of ERISA vis-&-vis the Matter of
Reimbursement
The absence of any discussion by the Court of the underlying policy
considerations regarding reimbursement is most likely attributable to
the basic nature of ERISA. Considerable judicial deference is accorded
to the scheme of ERISA and its goal of providing a workable set of
national rules for employee benefits.3 2 The majority opinion by Justice
Scalia recognizes that the ERISA scheme was designed by Congress to
be "'comprehensive and reticulated,'" the enactment having been

27. With whom Justices Stevens, Souter, and Breyer join in. Id. at 224 (Ginsburg, J.,
dissenting).
28. Id. (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
29. Id. at 223 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
30. Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
31. In FMC Corp. v. Holiday, 498 U.S. 52 (1990), the Court held that commercial
insurers insuring ERISA plans are indeed subject to the antisubrogation laws of the states,
by virtue of the "Saving Clause" found in § 514(b)(2)(A), codified at 29 U.S.C. § 1144(b)(2)(A) (2000).
32.
Federal preemption is the keystone that gives ERISA's arch the ability to span the
nation with a single, uniform, pension and welfare-benefit law. When Congress
manifested its intent to create such an exclusive federal presence in that field of
law, it expressly decreed perhaps the most comprehensive and pervasive
preemption of the present era.
Bauhaus USA, Inc. v. Copeland, 292 F.3d 439, 445 (5th Cir. 2002) (Wiener, J., dissenting).
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preceded by a decade of congressional study.33 Justice Ginsburg's
dissenting opinion also recognizes that the unique undertaking of ERISA
was "'to establish a uniform administrative scheme' and to ensure that
plan provisions would be enforced in federal court, free34of 'the threat of
conflicting or inconsistent State and local regulation.'"
Indeed, the preemptive nature of ERISA has been described by one
federal judge as "perhaps the most comprehensive and pervasive
preemption of the present era."3" Understandably the Court might be
reluctant to engage in an analysis of policy considerations, which
support or oppose reimbursement-a mere component of a plan provision
belonging to one of many plans governed by the ERISA scheme. The
role of the Court in ERISA cases has been to interpret the statutes that
set up the ERISA mechanism with an eye toward preserving the
preemptive nature of the scheme.
However, ERISA does not require or even endorse the idea of
reimbursement. The device of "reimbursement" only recently evolved as
an alternative method for an insurer to secure money in situations when
an insurer might have a subrogation interest but otherwise would be
precluded from recovery.3 6 In that regard, the prospect of subrogation
in the area of medical expense claims (and the corresponding tool of

33. Knudson, 534 U.S. at 209. "We have observed repeatedly that ERISA is a
'comprehensive and reticulated statute,' the product of a decade of congressional study of
the Nation's private employee benefit system." Id. (quoting Mertens, 508 U.S. at 251).
34. Id. at 227 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (quoting Fort Halifax Packing Co. v. Coyne, 482
U.S. 1, 9 (1987)).
35. Bauhaus USA, 292 F.3d at 445 (Wiener, J., dissenting).
36. Because of the common-law prohibition against the assignment of personal injury
claims, health insurers seeking subrogation rights soon learned that it was wiser to
characterize their claims as ones of "reimbursement," not subrogation. In other words, the
insurer would not be so bold as to actually seek to initiate a lawsuit for personal injuries
as a subrogation claim (which would be prohibited under the common-law rule that
prohibits the assignment of personal injury claims). Instead, the insurer would simply
require that it be reimbursed by funds collected by the insured from a tortfeasor. See
generally Roger M. Baron, Subrogation: A Pandora'sBoxAwaiting Closure, 41 S.D. L. REV.
237, 239 (1996). The evolution of reimbursement as an alternative tool to subrogation has
been described by one jurist as, "a creeping erosion of the anti-subrogation principle
established at common law." Lee v. State Farm Mut. Ins. Co., 129 Cal. Rptr. 271, 278 (Cal.
Ct. App. 1976) (Friedman, J., concurring).
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"reimbursement")7 is of relatively recent origin, having only been
developed in the last thirty to forty years.3 8
When a decade-long congressional study39 (which preceded the
adoption of ERISA in 1974) was undertaken, the concept of "reimbursement" for medical expense claims was virtually nonexistent. This is
because subrogation itself on personal injury claims had been disallowed
by all courts until only recently.4 ° Some jurisdictions have never
41
permitted subrogation or reimbursement for medical expense claims.
Even today, some jurisdictions, which initially decided to permit
subrogation on medical expense claims, have since reconsidered the
appropriateness of doing so.4
These jurisdictions have come to
conclude, either by judicial decision or by statute, that subrogation and
reimbursement on medical expense claims is inappropriate and should
not be allowed.'
Despite the fact ERISA is unique and may represent "the most
comprehensive and pervasive preemption of the present era,"" the fact
remains that nothing in the ERISA scheme authorizes or endorses either
the concept of reimbursement or the concept of subrogation in the matter
of medical expense claims. Neither the matter of reimbursement nor the

37. It now appears, with a twist of irony, that to distinguish the decision in Knudson,
which dealt with a reimbursement provision, there has been an effort to characterize a
subrogation provision as fundamentally different from the reimbursement provision utilized
in Knudson. Bauhaus USA, 292 F.3d at 445 (Wiener, J., dissenting). "Another important
distinction between Great-WestLife and the instant case is the nature of the obligation that
Bauhaus ... asserts is to subrogation, not reimbursement ....
The subrogation remedy
contained in the instant provisions is doctrinally distinguishable from the varieties of
restitution discussed in Great-West Life." Id. at 451-52 (Wiener, J., dissenting).
The majority in Bauhaus concluded differently than Judge Wiener and stated, "We
conclude that the facts of the instant case are indistinguishable in principle from GreatWest." Id. at 445.
The distinction between "pure subrogation" and reimbursement for the purpose of
avoiding the stare decisis effect of Knudson was rejected in Extendicare v. Crow, 2002 WL
32079263, at *2 (N.D. Tex. Oct. 23, 2002).
38. Roger M. Baron, Subrogation on Medical Expense Claims: The "DoubleRecovery"
Myth and the Feasibilityof Anti-Subrogation Laws, 96 DICK. L. REV. 581, 583 (1992);
Baron, A Pandora'sBox, supra note 36.
39. Knudson, 534 U.S. at 209.
40. Baron, A Pandora'sBox, supra note 36, at 238-41.
41. Id. at 240 n.21 and accompanying text; Baron, Subrogation on Medical Expense
Claims, supra note 38, at 584-85.
42. Baron, Subrogationon MedicalExpense Claims, supra note 38, at 584-85. Elaine
M. Rinaldi, Apportionment of Recovery between Insured and Insurerin a SubrogationCase,
29 TORT & INs. L.J. 803, 807 (1994). Rinaldi reported that twenty-five jurisdictions have
now adopted the "make whole" doctrine.
43. Baron, Subrogationon MedicalExpense Claims, supranote 38, at 584-85 nn.26-33.
44. Bauhaus USA, 292 F.3d at 445.
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matter of subrogation are to be found addressed or endorsed anywhere
within the "complete and reticulated" ERISA statutory scheme.45

C.

Federal Judicial Opinions Subsequent to Knudson

Several federal opinions, from both district courts and courts of
appeals, decided after Knudson, have followed the majority opinion and
denied a federal remedy to ERISA plans seeking reimbursement for
medical expenses paid for plan members. Other opinions have permitted
reimbursement. A few of these post-Knudson decisions will be reviewed
in the following sections.
1. Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals. About four months after the
Supreme Court handed down the decision in Knudson, the Fifth Circuit
Court of Appeals decided Bauhaus USA, Inc. v. Copeland.'
In
Bauhaus the ERISA plan sought reimbursement of $46,229.45 for
medical expenses paid for a seven-year-old child injured in a car
accident.4 7 From the negotiated settlement of $750,000, the sum of
$78,161.47 was deposited into the Registry of the Lee County Chancery
Court in Mississippi. Under the applicable Mississippi law, court
approval was required for the assignment of a minor's right to the
insurance proceeds. Preferring not to litigate its reimbursement claim
in state court, the ERISA plan filed an action in federal court suing the
minor, her mother, and the tortfeasors. The plan argued that Mississippi law was preempted by ERISA. 4 The trial court dismissed the plan's
complaint, finding "that ERISA did not preempt Mississippi's antiassignment rule, and therefore, that it did not have jurisdiction to hear
the case."49 The trial court's decision came in March 2001, some nine
months prior to the Supreme Court's decision in Knudson."° On appeal

45. "ERISA says nothing about subrogation provisions. ERISA neither requires a
welfare plan to contain a subrogation clause nor does it bar such clauses or otherwise
regulate their content." Member Servs. Life Ins. Co. v. Am. Nat'l Bank & Trust Co. of
Sapulpa, 130 F.3d 950, 958 (10th Cir. 1997) (quoting Ryan v. Fed. Express Corp., 78 F.3d
123, 127 (3d Cir. 1996)).
46. 292 F.3d 439 (5th Cir. 2002).
47. Id. at 440. The Plan document actually purported not to cover injuries to plan
members which resulted from the acts of someone else. According to the opinion, the Plan
"honored [the] request for benefits and elected to advance payments for [the minor's]
medical expenses." Id.
48. Id. at 442.
49. Id. at 441-42.
50. 534 U.S. 204.
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the Fifth Circuit did not reach the merits of the question as to whether
the state "anti-assignment" law was preempted.5 The appellate court,
rather, followed Knudson and affirmed the dismissal because there was
a failure of federal jurisdiction.5 2 Judge Wiener dissented.5 ' The
majority opinion reviewed Knudson in detail and found that it was
indistinguishable.5 4 That the disputed proceeds had been deposited in
a state court registry was of no consequence to the majority.5 In his
dissenting opinion, Judge Wiener expressed a belief that the location of
the funds in the state court registry was sufficient reason to distinguish
Knudson.5"

51. 292 F.3d at 442.
52. Id. at 445. "For reasons stated above, we affirm the district court's dismissal of this
suit for lack of federal jurisdiction because ERISA does not authorize this suit.
Consequently, we do not reach the parties' preemption arguments." Id.

53. Id. (Wiener, J., dissenting).
54. Id. at 443-45.
We conclude that the facts of the instant case are indistinguishable from GreatWest. Both cases involve ERISA-governed employee benefit plans that include
reimbursement provisions allowing the plans to recover from any settlement
proceeds any amount the plans advanced for medical expenses resulting from
third party wrong-doing. Third-party tortfeasors injured the plan beneficiaries in
both cases, and the plans advanced funds to the beneficiaries for medical
expenses. In both cases, the plan beneficiaries made tort settlements with thirdparty tortfeasors following suit in state court. In both, the plan administrator or
assignee filed suit in the federal district court seeking declaratory relief that it
was entitled to repayment of the benefits it had conferred.
Id. at 445.
55. Id.
In Great-West, the proceeds of the settlement were placed in a private Special
Needs Trust outside the possession and control of the plan beneficiary.
Nevertheless, the defendants in this case, like the Knudsons in Great-West, are
not in possession of the disputed funds, a fact that Justice Scalia found extremely
important in Great-West.
Id. at 445.
56. Id. at 450-51 (Wiener, J., dissenting).
In deciding today's case, the majority glides past the most salient factual
distinction between this case and Great-West .... There was no parallel
guardianship proceeding and thus no money in a state-court registry, as there are
here. The posture of the instant case thus differs markedly from the posture that
ultimately determined the outcome in Great-West Life.
Funds in the registry of a court are deposited in the court's bank, which is
otherwise uninvolved in the case. Such funds are truly in legal limbo vis-a-vis
parties in interest .... Here the disputed funds have not yet been distributed in
the sense seized upon by the Court in Great-WestLife, and the parties agree that
the funds are more than sufficient to satisfy [the plan's] claim. There is thus no
conceivable danger, in this case's current posture, of the district court's imposing
general, personal, contractual liability on anyone. The relief sought by [the plan]
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2. Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals. In PrimaxRecoveries, Inc.
v. Sevilla,57 a unanimous Seventh Circuit decision authored by Judge
Posner, the court found itself bound to the Supreme Court decision in
Knudson."s Although the facts of the case and the posture of the
parties were considerably different than those in Knudson, the same
result was attained. The opinion in Primax is one of the more recent
decisions by a federal court of appeals on this issue and was handed
down on April 1, 2003."9 The underlying dispute had been percolating
for more than a decade, primarily in Illinois State Court.6" Primax
involved a medical expense claim of only $2,483.71, for which the plan
sought reimbursement when the plan member acquired a tort settlement
of $22,000. The tortfeasor's insurer issued a check for the claim amount,
$2,483.71, which was payable to the client, the client's lawyer, and to
Primax Recoveries, Inc. ("Primax"), the ERISA plan's assignee for
collection purposes. The check was never cashed because Primax would
not agree to allow the client's lawyer to retain one-third of the $2,483.71,
pursuant to the Illinois "common fund" doctrine."
Primax retained
possession of the check and initially brought suit in state court against
the plan member and his lawyer, seeking 100 percent of the medical
expense claim. In response, a class action counterclaim was asserted on
behalf of other employees against whom Primax had similarly refused
to permit a common fund deduction for attorney fees.62 Unhappy with
the attempted class action counterclaim,6 Primax attempted to dismiss

is not in personam against [the minor or her mother], but is in rem against funds
possessed by a neutral stakeholder.
Id. (Wiener, J., dissenting).
57. 324 F.3d 544 (7th Cir. 2003).
58. Id. at 547.
59. Id. at 544.
60. Id. at 546. "This procedurally intricate ERISA case had its origins more than a
decade ago .... " Id.
61. Id. The "common fund" doctrine is explained in the opinion. Id. at 548-49. It is
an exception to prevailing American view that attorney fees are not recoverable. This
exception permits a deduction of an attorney fee when the attorney "creates a fund" that
benefits more than just his client. The rationale is that each person or entity that benefits
from the creation and preservation of a common fund should pay his or her share of the
costs incurred in the process. The common fund approach in subrogation is one of several
doctrines which are utilized to ameliorate the harshness encountered when insurers began
asserting subrogation rights for medical expense payments. See Baron, A Pandora'sBox,
supra note 36, at 247-60 (discussing the common fund doctrine at 255-60).
62. Primax, 324 F.3d at 546.
63. The motion for certification had been made but not ruled upon by the state court.
Primax, 324 F.3d at 546-47.
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its state court action' and then filed suit in federal court basing
jurisdiction on ERISA. Primax sought a declaration that the plan
overrides the state-law common-fund doctrine. The federal trial court
dismissed the suit. The court of appeals affirmed the dismissal, coming
very close to imposing monetary sanctions against Primax for even
bringing the law suit in federal court.6 5
Unlike in Knudson, in which the money had been set aside in a
Special Needs Trust, in Primax, the money that could have reimbursed
the ERISA plan was delivered as a check payable to the plan member,
the member's attorney, and the ERISA plan's assignee. 6 This difference, however, was not a sufficient distinction to avoid the holding of
Knudson:
Primax wants... $2,431.78 from [plan member] Sevilla. It is true that
Primax is holding on to the check from the third party's insurer, but
the check is worthless without the endorsement of Sevilla's lawyer .. ,
and while one could imagine construing Primax's suit as a suit for an
injunction commanding the lawyer to do that, this would distort the
reality of the claim. Primax doesn't want the check as such; it wants
the money, and it claims that under the plan Sevilla owes the money
to it. That is a claim of breach of contract, which is a classic legal
claim. Almost any legal claim can be given the form of an equitable
claim (that is, a claim seeking an order to do or not do something), but
such games with form should be discouraged .... So to this day the
fund remains in the hands of the insurer, who is not a defendant. You
can impose a constructive trust only on a defendant ... or someone in
privity with the defendant.67
In describing the state of the law concerning the ability of a plan to
sue a plan member, as a result of the decision in Knudson, the Seventh
Circuit's opinion states,

64. Primax attempted to release the plan member from any reimbursement obligation,
but, as pointed out by Judge Posner, even if the dispute with the named plaintiff is
rendered moot, the remaining class members' claims remain viable. Id. at 546.
65. Id. at 547-50.
Primax's suit has indeed been a travesty. Desperately seeking to derail a
counterclaim filed in the forum that it itself had chosen for litigating its dispute
with [the plan member], it filed a suit in federal court over which the court had
no jurisdiction. Had [the plan member] not muddied the waters by refusing to
accept the release of Primax's claim against it, we would consider Primax's claim
deserving of monetary sanctions. As it is, let a sharp rebuke suffice.
Id. at 550.
66. Id. at 546.
67. Id. at 547-48.
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The Supreme Court, consistent with an earlier decision by this
court['

]

...

has now made clear that... an ERISA fiduciary ...

may

not sue a plan participant or plan beneficiary under ERISA unless it
is seeking equitable relief, such relief includes not just an injunction
but also the imposition of a constructive trust on money claimed to be
wrongfully withheld from the plaintiff.69
The opinion in Primax also goes to some length to demonstrate that
the underlying dispute did not arise under ERISA but rather arose
under the common fund doctrine of Illinois.7 ° And, even if a state court
defendant may be able to defend the common fund claim by interposing
ERISA preemption, it would still be a state law claim. 7' The opinion
states, "federal jurisdiction depends on the claim, not upon defenses,
even ERISA preemption defenses. Anyway we have held that ERISA
does not preempt common fund claims." 2
3. Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals. In Westaff (USA), Inc. v.
Arce,73 an ERISA plan sued its plan member seeking reimbursement
of medical expenses when she acquired a settlement of $15,000 against
the tortfeasor. The check from the tortfeasor's insurer was made
payable to both the plan member and to Westaff, the ERISA plan, as copayees. By agreement, the check was cashed and placed in escrow. 4
The ERISA plan attempted "to characterize its claim as one for equitable
relief, labeling it a declaratory judgment action or action for specific
performance."75 The trial court held that the action was basically an
action seeking a money judgment, which was not permitted under the
ERISA statutes. It dismissed the action and awarded attorney fees to

68. The majority opinion in Knudson, authored by Justice Scalia, quotes Judge Posner's
opinion in Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Wells, 213 F.3d 398, 401 (7th Cir. 2000). 534 U.S. at
210.
69. 324 F.3d at 547.
70. Id. at 548.
71. Id. at 549.
72. Id. Compare with Arana v. Ochsner Health Plan, 338 F.3d 433 (5th Cir. 2003),
which holds that the insured's declaratory judgment action filed in state court (seeking
disposition of a tort settlement proceeds free of reimbursement) was completely preempted
by ERISA despite the fact the claim was not conflict-preempted by ERISA. Id. at 439. In
making the distinction between complete preemption and conflict preemption, the court
stated, "Conflict preemption, also known as ordinary preemption, arises when a federal law
conflicts with state law, thus providing a federal defense to a state law claim, but does not
completely preempt the field of state law so as to transform a state law claim into a federal
claim." Id.
73. 298 F.3d 1164 (9th Cir. 2002).
74. Id. at 1166.
75. Id.
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the plan member.76 The Ninth Circuit affirmed both the dismissal and
the award of attorney fees.77 With regard to the fact that the money
had been placed in escrow, the appellate court stated,
This case differs from our prior cases only in that the money at issue,
a legitimate personal injury settlement to which the beneficiary is
entitled, has been placed in an escrow account and remains specifically
identifiable. The action remains one for money damages. The district
court correctly recognized this and dismissed the case for failure to
state a claim.78
With regard to the attorney fees awarded to the plan member, the
argument was made that the trial court lacked jurisdiction to make the
award. 7' This argument was rejected by the appellate court, which
recognized that the dismissal was on the merits because the ERISA
plan's complaint failed to state a claim, not due to a lack of subject
matter jurisdiction. 0
In a more recent opinion involving an assertion of restitution, but not
in the context of a personal injury claim, the Ninth Circuit again denied
a federal forum to an ERISA plan.8' The court stated, "The Supreme
Court cases interpreting § 1132(a)(3) mark a steadily shrinking field of
'appropriate equitable relief' available to plan fiduciaries." 2
4. Other Federal Opinions. This Article will not attempt to
present a review of all the federal court opinions which have been
handed down since Knudson. A brief summary follows.
Few additional post-Knudson opinions exist in the federal courts of
appeals which deal with situations involving reimbursement. Two
76. Id.
77. Id.
78. Id. at 1167.
79. Id.
80. Id.
We have held that a district court lacks jurisdiction to award fees under a feeshifting statute if it has dismissed a case for lack of subject matter jurisdiction,
unless the fee-shifting statute provides an independent jurisdictional basis ....
However, when an ERISA plan administrator brings a suit seeking non-equitable
relief, dismissal is properly on the merits for failure to state a claim, rather than
for lack of subject matter jurisdiction ....The district court had jurisdiction to

enter a fee award.

Id.
81. Honolulu Joint Apprenticeship & Training Comm. of United Ass'n Local Union No.
675 v. Foster, 332 F.3d 1234 (9th Cir. 2003).
82. Id. at 1237 (denying federal forum to ERISA plan seeking repayment of $13,183.92
for costs in training defendant as apprentice in plumbing and pipefitting industry, after
defendant breached terms of contract for training by working for non-union employer).
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opinions by the Sixth Circuit have denied ERISA plans the opportunity
to seek reimbursement in federal court."3 Both of these opinions were
"Not Recommended for Full-Text Publication."' Also, a Fourth Circuit
decision permitted an ERISA plan to assert a lien on the proceeds of a
settlement secured by a bankruptcy court debtor, affirming the decisions
of both the bankruptcy court and the district court. 85 Similar to the
Sixth Circuit cases, this case was "not selected for publication."86
At the district court level, numerous opinions deny ERISA plans the
right to seek reimbursement.8 7 However, some opinions permit the

83. Cmty. Ins. Co. v. Morgan, 54 Fed. Appx. 828, 29 Employee Benefits Cas. 2104,2002
WL 31870325 (6th Cir. Dec. 20, 2002); Unicare Life & Health Ins. Co. v. Saiter, 37 Fed.
Appx. 171, 2002 WL 1301574 (6th Cir. June 10, 2002).
84. Morgan, 54 Fed. Appx. at 828; Saiter, 37 Fed. Appx. at 171.
85. In re Carpenter, 36 Fed. Appx. 80, 2002 WL 1162277 (4th Cir. June 3, 2002).
86. Id. at 80.
87. There are many such reported opinions. Only a few are set forth here: Primax
Recoveries Inc. v. Goss, 240 F. Supp. 2d 800 (N.D. Ill.
2002). In that case, the ERISA plan,
which had paid $491,641.78 in medical benefits, sought to impose a trust prospectively on
recovery when it is realized by plan member. Id. at 801.
The only factual difference between this case and Knudson is that here plaintiffs
seek to impose a trust on funds which have not yet been received (and may never
be) by defendant .... We read the Court's opinion in Knudson to stand for the
proposition that, regardless of their motivation, Congress drew a clear line
between suits-at-law and suits-at-equity, only the latter of which are authorized
.... Allowing suits of this nature would allow parties to circumvent the statute
based simply on when they file the lawsuit, rather than the relief they desire. We
believe that suits like this are basically suits for money damages "since they seek
no more than compensation for loss resulting from the defendant's breach of legal
duty."
Id. at 802-03 (internal citations omitted). This case also cites Primax Recoveries, Inc. v.
Carey, 247 F. Supp. 2d 337 (S.D.N.Y. 2002), in which Judge Lynch held that a similar suit
by an ERISA plan was barred by the decision in Knudson. Id. at 345. Judge Lynch stated,
"Surely the same conclusion follows a fortiori when the 'settlement proceeds' are in
nobody's possession, because they are the entirely hypothetical fruit of a potential future
settlement that does not yet exist and may never come into being at all." Id. at 342 n.5.
InExtendicare v. Crow, 2002 WL 32079263 (N.D. Tex. Oct. 23, 2002), the liability insurer
tendered policy limits of $50,000, but the plan member had not yet settled. Id. at *1. "In
the instant case, however, Defendant Crow has made no settlement with any third-party
tortfeasor. Like the plan beneficiaries in both Great-West Life and Copeland, Defendant
Crow is not in possession of the disputed funds." Id. at *4. This opinion also rejects the
urged distinction that the ERISA plan in this case was seeking "pure subrogation" as
opposed to reimbursement as seen in Knudson. Id. at *2.
In Asbestos Workers Local No. 42 Welfare Fund v. Brewster, 227 F. Supp. 2d 226 (D. Del.
2002), funds that were previously placed in an escrow account were fully paid out, and the
court rejected the ERISA plan's claim for reimbursement. Id. at 228.
In response to the Defendant's Motion, the Plan attempts to distinguish this case
from Knudson on the basis that the funds at issue in Knudson were in trust and
not under the control of the plan participant, as is the case here where the funds
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ERISA plan reimbursement, therefore finding a way to distinguish
Knudson."s The most dominant "exception" to the Knudson result

have been dispersed to the Defendants ....
The Court is unpersuaded by the
Plan's attempt to distinguish this case from Knudson.

Id.
The court in Carey rejected an effort by the ERISA plan's assignee to assert a lien on tort
settlement or recovery while the tort action was still pending. 247 F. Supp. 2d at 345.
"Although the majority's reasoning was sharply criticized in two dissenting opinions....
Knudson authoritatively resolves the scope of ERISA's civil enforcement provision." Id. at
342. This opinion also stated that recovery is barred by the underlying substantive New
York law, which excludes from recovery to the tort plaintiff "any such cost or expense [that]
was or will with reasonable certainty, be replaced or indemnified from any collateral
source." Id. at 343. "Pursuant to that rule, if Carey prevails in her state court action, any
judgment she receives will be reduced by the amount awarded to her under the Plan,
specifically, by the $91,688.88 Primax seeks." Id.
88. A few such decisions are summarized here. In Forslingv. Keller & Assocs., 241 F.
Supp. 2d 915 (E.D. Wis. 2003), the action was commenced by a plan member against the
plan. Defendant plan impleaded the liability insurer, which stood ready to pay the policy
limit of $50,000. Id. at 916.
[Plan] admits (as it must) that it is seeking to recover money, but argues that it
has followed the lead of Knudson and has adequately stated grounds in equity for
the imposition of a constructive trust on the property at issue here. It is not, as
in Knudson, seeking to impose personal liability upon the plaintiffs, as plaintiffs
are not in possession of the property in dispute, and the funds are held by a
named defendant and have not been dissipated.
Id. at 918.
The court in IBEW-NECA Southwestern Health & Benefit Fund v. Douthitt,211 F. Supp.
2d 812 (N.D. Tex. 2002), stated
The facts of the instant case are distinguishable from Great-West Life and
Copeland. First, [pilaintiffs seek to impose a constructive trust over funds
currently being held by [d]efendant's attorney in his client trust account ....
Second, unlike the settlement proceeds in Copeland and in Great-West Life, the
funds held by [diefendant in this case are presently within his possession and
control.
Id. at 816. The court cited, as supporting authority, three additional federal district court
opinions from the Middle District of Georgia, the Northern District of Illinois, and the
District of North Dakota. Id.
In Primax Recoveries, Inc. v. Lee, 260 F. Supp. 2d 43, (D.D.C. 2003), the court stated,
(iun this case, a portion of the settlement funds are being held in trust by
defendant's prior attorney .... While defendant's current counsel is unaware of
the amount of funds being so held ....
the Court cannot conclude that the funds
sought are so far dispersed that they no longer are traceable to defendant. On the
contrary, it appears that defendant has set aside these funds for the precise
purpose of reimbursing the Plan and that the money at issue therefore has been
'dissipated" no farther than directly into a trust held by defendant's former
attorney ....
Under post Great-West case law, plaintiffs claim therefore seems
to be a claim for restitution in equity (not in law), and the motion to dismiss
therefore must be denied.
Id. at 48.
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occurs when the funds are in the possession and control of a named
defendant.89 This exception has been termed as the "possession theory"
exception to Knudson.9" Under this theory, Knudson would prohibit
actions by ERISA plans to seek reimbursement only "if the insured is
not in the possession of clearly identifiable proceeds."91 Not all
92
opinions that favor the ERISA plan fall under the possession theory.
Note that the possession theory is inconsistent with the view recently
expressed by the Ninth Circuit that an ERISA plan simply has no cause
of action for reimbursement. 93
5.
Continued Absence of Public Policy Considerations.
Throughout the many federal decisions handed down since Knudson, any
real discussion of the underlying public policy considerations as to why
reimbursement should be permitted is absent. As with the majority and
dissenting opinions in Knudson, the statutory scheme of ERISA is the
primary point of focus. Additionally, most of the analyses by the lower
courts attempt to review the language of the opinion in Knudson and to
decipher exactly what it means. As suggested in the title to this Article,
the time has come for judicial authorities to do more. The significant
public policy reasons that warrant the denial of reimbursement to
ERISA plans should now be considered.

89. See Forsling,241 F. Supp. 2d at 918; IBEW-NECA, 211 F. Supp. 2d at 816.
90. Wellmark, Inc. v. Deguara, 257 F. Supp. 2d 1209, 1214-16, (S.D. Iowa 2003).
Post-Great-West courts dealing with the issue of whether subrogation clauses can
be litigated under ERISA have taken two different approaches. Several courts
have reasoned that after Great-West, the type of relief the insurer seeks turns on
whether the insured is in possession of funds .... On the other hand, the Ninth
Circuit found that any attempt by an insurer to enforce the terms of a subrogation
clause is a request for reimbursement which is legal relief and not available under
§ 502(a)(3) .... This Court finds the possession theory is the correct read of
Great-West. That is, attempts by an ERISA plan or insurer to recover settlement
proceeds to which it is entitled under a subrogation or reimbursement provision
are only prohibited under § 502(a)(3) if the insured is not in the possession of
clearly identifiable proceeds.
Id. at 1214-17.
91. Id. at 1216.
92. E.g., Lee, 260 F. Supp. 2d at 48.
93. Westaff (USA), 298 F.3d at 1166 ("However, when an ERISA plan administrator
brings a suit seeking non-equitable relief, dismissal is properly on the merits for failure to
state a claim, rather than for lack of subject matter jurisdiction .... The district court had
jurisdiction to enter a fee award.").
The inconsistency between the "possession theory" and the Ninth Circuit view was
recognized by the court in Wellmark v. Deguara, 257 F. Supp. 2d at 1215.
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PUBLIC POLICY CONSIDERATIONS SURROUNDING THE
REIMBURSEMENT QUESTION

Historically Disfavored

The historical roots of the doctrine of subrogation lie in equity.9 4 A
long history of subrogation exists in connection with property insurance
and property damage claims, but at common law, subrogation was not
permitted on personal injury claims. 9 A personal injury claim could
not be "assigned" at common law and, therefore, efforts to have
subrogation on personal injury claims ran afoul of this principle.9"
The effort to seek subrogation on personal injury claims also violated
the common-law prohibition against splitting a cause of action.97 The
existing practice of permitting subrogation on property damage claims
had been tolerated as an exception to this prohibition, but historically,
courts were unwilling to permit an exception in the area of personal
injury claims.98

94.
The principle of subrogation will be applied or not, according to the dictates of
equity and good conscience, and to consideration of public policy, resting, as it
does, upon the maxim that no one should be enriched by another's loss. In fact,
subrogation is not a matter of strict right, nor does it necessarily rest on a
contract, but is purely equitable in nature, and will not be enforced when it would
work injustice to the rights of those having equal equities. Subrogation is an
established branch of equitable jurisprudence, being a creature of the courts of
equity, and having for its basis, the doing of complete and perfect justice, without
regard to form, in all cases where the equities demand it.
16 GEORGE J. COUCH, COUCH ON INSURANCE § 61:19 at 97-98 (2d ed. 1983).

"[Tihe English doctrine of subrogation is a 'local' creation. Its beginnings may be found
in equity, particularly during the Chancellorship of Hardwicke." M.L. Marasinghe, An
HistoricalIntroductionto the Doctrine ofSubrogation:The Early History of the Doctrine II,
10 VAL. U. L. REV. 275, 298 (1976).

See also Eric J. Pickar, Westfield Insurance Company, Inc. v. Rowe: The South Dakota
Supreme Court Rejects The Common Law "MadeWhole" DoctrineOn A PropertyInsurance
Subrogation Claim, 47 S.D. L. REV. 316, 323 (2002).
95. Baron, Subrogation on Medical Expense Claims, supra note 38, at 583; Baron, A
Pandora'sBox, supra note 36, at 238 nn.7-10.
96. Baron, A Pandora'sBox, supra note 36, at 239 n.13; Baron, Subrogation on Medical
Expense Claims, supra note 38, at 583 n.11 and accompanying text.
97. E.g., Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. DeJane, 326 N.E.2d 701 (Ohio Ct. App. 1974).
98. In Nationwide the court recognized that subrogation on property damage claims
was an authorized exception to the prohibition against splitting a cause of action. Id. at
703-04. But, as to personal injury claims, the court stated, "We feel that by not permitting

subrogation of medical expenses we are preserving the orderly nature of practice in this
state by following the rule that one cannot split a cause of action, avoid multiplicity of suits
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Efforts to create a right of subrogation on personal injury claims
intensified in the 1960s. Insurers attempted to create the same sort of
property damage subrogation right for those policy provisions that
provided medical expense coverage in connection with automobile
policies.99 With persistence by insurers, the right of subrogation began
to be recognized in first-party medical payments coverage in automobile
policies, uninsured and underinsured motorist coverage, and eventually
in medical and hospitalization coverage.' 00
Because the creation of a right of subrogation on a medical expense
claim could be easily viewed as a transparent attempt to create an
assignment of a personal injury claim, insurers also utilized the
seemingly less offensive, but equally effective, "right of reimbursement."' 01 Some jurisdictions refused to extend subrogation rights into
personal injury claims, recognizing that to do so would be equivalent to

and benefit the insured public and the public at large." Id. at 705.
99. A partial history of the "evolution" of the forms utilized from 1965 forward can be
found in Lee v. State Farm Mut. Ins. Co., 129 Cal. Rptr. 271 (Cal. Ct. App. 1976)
(adjudicating the validity of the insurer's progressive efforts to establish an obligation of
.reimbursement" for medical expense claims).
100. Baron, Subrogation on Medical Expense Claims, supra note 38, at 79.
101. In re Estate of Scott, 567 N.E.2d 605 (Ill. App. Ct. 1991).
The estate also argues that [the Plan's] subrogation interest amounts to an
Contrary
assignment of a personal tort, which is void against public policy ....
to the estate's assertion, the language of the Plan's subrogation provision does not
call for the full assignment of the insured's rights but, rather, mere reimbursement of amounts forwarded by the Plan.
Id. at 607. (ERISA plan, which had paid $200,000 in medical expenses allowed to recover
entire balance of settlement ($82,000), recovered from tortfeasor following payment of
court-approved fees, leaving nothing for plan beneficiary who was seriously injured while
riding as a passenger on a motorcycle).
Plaintiffs place emphasis upon the fact that each of the challenged provisions is
prefaced by the label "subrogation." Subrogation or assignment of a cause of action
for personal injury operates to transfer from one person to another that cause
against a third party. The reasons of policy against the assignment or subrogation
of certain personal causes do not apply to insurance policy provisions that merely
require the insured to reimburse the insurer out of any recovery or settlement.
Lee, 129 Cal. Rptr. at 276; Compare
I concur, but with reluctance ... [citation of two earlier California decisions
omitted] ... In composite, these two decisions represent a creeping erosion of the
The successive
anti-subrogation principle established at common law ...
amendments of State Farm's "reimbursement" clauses illustrate how eagerly and
quickly the disingenuous draftsmen of insurance policies move into the gaps
created by decisional erosion ....
The cumulative effect of the policy provisions
is to create the economic reality of subrogation to the personal injury claim
without its language.
Id. at 278 (Freidman, J., concurring).
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"lifting the lid on a Pandora's Box crammed with both practical and legal
problems." 10 2 Some jurisdictions that initially agreed to allow the
extension have since reconsidered, either by judicial decision 0 3 or by
legislative action,10 4 and have retreated back to the historical view
prohibiting subrogation and reimbursement for medical expense
claims.' 05
The idea that the doctrine of subrogation for medical expense claims
has "flourished under the law" 1' is simply wrong.10 7 Even in the
jurisdictions where it is permitted, tremendous litigation over its
propriety has occurred.0 8 The vast majority of jurisdictions have
adopted restrictive doctrines designed to ameliorate the harshness which
accompanies the allowance of subrogation or reimbursement in personal
injury cases. 0 9 The most common of these restrictive doctrines is the

102. Travelers Indem. Co. v. Chumbley, 394 S.W.2d 418, 425 (Mo. Ct. App. 1965); see
also State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v. Knapp, 484 P.2d 180 (Ariz. 1971) (quoting Chumbley,
394 S.W.2d at 425).
103. Baron, Subrogationon Medical Expense Claims, supra note 38, at 585 nn.26-29.
104. Id. at 585 nn.30-33.
105. Id. nn.33-36.
106. Brief of Amici Curiae The American Association of Health Plans et al. Knudson,
534 U.S. 204 (2002) (No. 99-1786). The amicus brief filed with the Supreme Court by the
health insurance industry in the Knudson case asserted, "Private insurers have been
relying on reimbursement mechanisms since at least the mid-eighteenth century to ensure
that coverage remains accessible and affordable for all." Id. at 8.
107.
The Health Insurance Industry Brief correctly states that doctrine of subrogation
generally has a long history in the law, . .. but incorrectly suggests that
subrogation by health insurers in personal injury cases has an equally long
history. In fact, subrogation by health insurers is a practice of relatively recent
origin, and the historic body of law permitting subrogation stems from property
damage cases, and not from personal injury cases.
Brief of Amici Curiae Maryland HMO Subrogation Plaintiffs at 17, Knudson, 534 U.S. 204
(2002) (No. 99-1786).
108. See generally Baron, A Pandora'sBox, supra note 36, at 238-60.
109. Id. Five such doctrines have evolved. Id. Beginning with that which is most
beneficial to the insured and progressing to the least beneficial, they are as follows: (1)
outright denial of subrogation, Id. at 247; (2) the "make whole" doctrine where the actual
amount considered is that received by the insured after payment of attorney fees and costs,
Id. at 249; (3) the "make whole" doctrine where the insured is assumed to receive 100% of
the recovery from the tortfeasor, Id.; (4) the "pro rata loss sharing" method where the
insurer takes a corresponding reduction in its subrogated recovery to match the reduction
taken by the insured, Id. at 252; and (5) the "common fund" doctrine. Id. at 256. See id.
at 247-60.
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"make whole" doctrine," ° which has also been supported by federal
courts through the application of "federal common law.""'
"Because We Say So"-The UnilateralNature of Reimbursment
The primary argument asserted by ERISA plans for the enforcement
of reimbursement provisions is simply that the plan has incorporated the
right of reimbursement into the plan document and that it should be
enforced." 2 The right of reimbursement, although unilaterally implanted into the plan document, was described by the petitioners in
Knudson as "a vitally important provision of the Plan."" 3 Petitioners
also urged the Court to consider that "another primary objective of
ERISA is to ensure the enforcement of the terms of a plan."" 4
This argument, articulated in the first person of the ERISA plans
themselves, could be stated as follows: "We have given ourselves the
right to reimbursement and it should be enforced without question."
Reduced to basic terms, the argument is simply, "Because we say so."
The simplicity of this argument also exists in Justice Stevens's brief
dissenting opinion, in which he stated the following:
B.

Contrary to the Court's current reluctance to conclude that wrongs
should be remedied, I believe that the historic presumption favoring
the provision of remedies for violations of federal rights should inform
our construction of the remedial provisions of federal statutes. It is
difficult for me to understand why Congress would not have wanted to
provide recourse in federal court for the plan violation disclosed by the
record in this case.115

110. Elaine M. Rinaldi, Apportionment of Recovery Between Insured and Insurer in a
Subrogation Case, 29 TORT & INS. L.J. 803, 807 (1994) (listing 25 states, in alphabetical
order, which have adopted some version of the "make whole" doctrine).
111. David M. Kono, Unraveling the Lining of ERISA Health InsurerPockets-A Vote
for National Federal Common Law Adoption of the Make Whole Doctrine, 2000 BYU L.
REV. 427, 437 (2000) (reviewing the many federal court decisions that have imposed the
"make whole" doctrine as a matter of federal common law).
112. The following argument was set forth in the Brief filed by Petitioners in Knudson:
As the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit has stated, "a primary purpose
"
of ERISA is to ensure the integrity and primacy of the written plans ....
Affirming the Ninth Circuit's holding in this case, however, would leave the Plan
without a remedy to enforce a vitally important provision of the Plan....
Petitioners' Brief at 28, Knudson, 534 U.S. 204 (2002) (No. 99-1786).
113. Id. at 29.
114. Id. at 31.
115. Knudson, 534 U.S. at 223 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (footnotes omitted).
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This view assumes that whatever is put into the plan document
controls absolutely.'16 Whatever the plan deems as a "wrong" or a
"violation" would automatically warrant a federal judicial remedy
without regard to the lawfulness or appropriateness of the provision in
question. This argument is further supported, in bootstrapping fashion,
by the provision of the ERISA scheme that "requires fiduciaries to act in
accordance with the terms of a plan."" 7
What cannot be asserted is that ERISA itself provides for any right of
reimbursement. ERISA statutorily requires a written plan."1 ERISA
includes statutory provisions that dictate what is required" 9 to be in
the plan, and statutory provisions dictate what optional features may be
included. 120 But, nothing in the ERISA scheme endorses reimbursement or suggests that reimbursement is permitted under ERISA. The
device of "reimbursement" was only recently created as part of the
evolving law of subrogation on personal injury claims. 12' ERISA was
adopted by Congress in 1974, and this adoption was preceded by a
decade long congressional study.122 During this time period of study,
from the early 1960s to the early 1970s, it is doubtful that the matter of
reimbursement was even in existence as an insurance lexicon.

116. This view was also recently taken in the Seventh Circuit opinion in Administrative
Committee of the Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. Assocs. Health & Welfare Plan v. Varco, 338 F.3d
680 (7th Cir. 2003), in which the court upheld the plan's language which attempted to
negate the common fund doctrine by granting itself the right to recover,100 percent of
benefits paid, requiring the beneficiary to be solely responsible for attorney fees. Id. at
692. The court stated,
Finally, [the beneficiary] argues that by allowing the Committee to recoup its
medical payments even though it did not pay for the legal prosecution of the
action, we are essentially awarding them unjust enrichment. However, the
unambiguous language of the Plan obligates her to repay the benefits paid in full
without a pro rata deduction for her legal expenses, and thus any so-called
enrichment is not unjust.
Id.
117. Petitioner's Brief at 31, Knudson, 534 U.S. 204 (2002) (No. 99-1786). Footnote 13
of the brief cites § 404(a)(1)(D), codified at 29 U.S.C. § 1104(a)(1)(D) (2000), which provides,
[A] fiduciary shall discharge his duties with respect to a plan solely in the interest
of the participants and beneficiaries and.., in accordance with the documents
and instruments governing the plan insofar as such documents and instruments
are consistent with the provisions of this subchapter and subchapter III of this
chapter.
118. 29 U.S.C. § 1102(a) (2000), compare with 29 U.S.C. § 1022 (2000) (requiring a
written summary of the plan be furnished to participants and beneficiaries).
119. 29 U.S.C. § 1102(b) (2000).
120. 29 U.S.C. § 1102(c) (2000).
121. See supra notes 36-38, 101 and accompanying text.
122. Knudson, 534 U.S. at 209.
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Certainly, the idea of reimbursement had yet to be presented or
approved by the courts.'23
Although the ERISA scheme contains some detailed reporting
requirements,' plans are free to amend the language of their plan
documents as they see fit. 2 ' In fact the Supreme Court held in 1995,
"[W]e are mindful that ERISA does not create any substantive entitlement to employer-provided health benefits or any other kind of welfare
benefits. Employers or other plan sponsors are generally free under
ERISA, for any reason at any time, to adopt, modify, or terminate
welfare plans." 2 '
Furthermore, amendment of plan language, under ERISA, is not
subject to approval by any administrative or judicial authority. The plan
documents are unilaterally written and amended. 27 The inclusion of

123. Reimbursement for a medical expense claim was recognized in 1975 in South
Dakota and in 1976 in California. Schuldt v. State Farm Mut. Auto Ins., 238 N.W.2d 270
(S.D. 1975); Lee v. State Farm Mut. Ins. Co., 129 Cal. Rptr. 271 (Cal. Ct. App. 1976).
124. 29 U.S.C. §§ 1021-1031 (2000).
125. In the ongoing litigation spurned by efforts to seek reimbursement, there have
been decisions which may be "drafted around." For example, in Cagle v. Bruner, 112 F.3d
1510 (11th Cir. 1997), the court adopted the "make whole" doctrine as a default rule unless
"the plan does not explicitly preclude operation of the doctrine." Id. at 1521. Countless
ERISA plans have since been amended so as to exclude the operation of the "make whole"
by stating something to the effect, "The plan has the right to be reimbursed from any
money you collect from someone who caused your injuries, even if you are not fully
compensated for your injuries." Id. at 1518.
Similarly, plans have attempted to draft around the "common fund" doctrine, which is
prevalent under Illinois law and has been upheld in the federal courts in the Seventh
Circuit. It appears that at least one ERISA plan scored a recent victory with its selfserving unilateral amendment. In Varco, the court observed,
Significantly, for the purposes of appeal, the Plan includes a provision stating that
the Committee has a right to "recover or subrogate 100 percent of the benefits
paid or to be paid by the Plan on your behalf and/or your dependents to the extent
of... [any judgment, settlement or any payment made or to be made, relating
to the accident, including but not limited to other insurance." The Plan further
provides that it "does not pay for nor is responsible for the participant's attorney's
fees. Attorney's fees are to be paid solely by the participant."
338 F.3d at 683. In distinguishing prior case law in the Seventh Circuit, which upheld the
'common fund" doctrine, the court in Varco stated,
The plan at issue in [the prior case] did not expressly require beneficiaries to pay
their own attorney's fees. In this case, the Plan specifically provides that it "does
not pay for nor is responsible for the participant's attorney's fees. Attorney's fees
are to be paid solely by the participant."
Id. at 689.
126. Curtiss-Wright Corp. v. Schoonejongen, 514 U.S. 73, 78 (1995).
127.
When an insurer recovers under the right of subrogation, it has basically
reinsured itself, and thus has suffered no loss, i.e., it has received a windfall, the
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provisions relating to reimbursement or subrogation is neither specifically authorized nor is it specifically prohibited by statute. Accordingly, the
assertion by ERISA plans that reimbursement should automatically be
granted because the plan document provides for it should carry little
weight.
As previously stated in this Article, 12 neither the matter of reimbursement nor the matter of subrogation is addressed or endorsed
anywhere within the "complete and reticulated" ERISA statutory
scheme.' 29
On the other hand, in looking at legislative history,
Congress was motivated, at least in part, by "the absolute need that
safeguards for plan participants be sufficiently adequate and effective to
prevent the numerous inequities to workers under plans which have
resulted in tragic hardship to so many."3 0 The very first statutory
provision of the ERISA scheme sets forth a declaration of congressional
policy, including the following statement: "[Ilt is therefore desirable in
the interests of employees and their beneficiaries, for the protection of
the revenue of the United States, and to provide for free flow of
commerce, that minimum standards be provided assuring the equitable
character of such plans."' 3 '
Was it within the stated policy of Congress for Janette Knudson, a
quadriplegic, to be rendered penniless because her ERISA plan
unilaterally required that she reimburse it for medical expenses paid?
Is there an "equitable character" in such a result? When looking at the
ERISA scheme and its legislative history, the inescapable conclusion is
that the spirit and purpose of ERISA provide greater support for
prohibition of reimbursement than for its authorization.

very thing subrogation was created to prevent. As noted by Freedman, "the
doctrine of subrogation was conceived unilaterally, nurtured unilaterally, and cast
upon the courts for the unilateral interest of insurers generally. It must be
thoroughly reexamined from time to time."
Pickar, supra note 94, at 338 (quoting WARREN FREEDMAN, FREEDMAN'S RICHARDS ON
INSURANCE 360 (6th ed. 1990)).
128. See supra note 44-45 and accompanying text.
129. "T'ERISA says nothing about subrogation provisions. ERISA neither requires a
welfare plan to contain a subrogation clause nor does it bar such clauses or otherwise
regulate their content.'" Member Servs. Life Ins. Co. v. Am. Nat'l Bank & Trust Co. of
Sapulpa, 130 F.3d 950, 958 (10th Cir. 1997) (quoting Ryan v. Fed. Express Corp., 78 F.3d
123, 127 (3d Cir. 1996)).
130. H.R. REP. No. 93-533, at 9 (1974), reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4639,4647. See
also Kono, supra note 111, at 444 ("The clear focus of ERISA intent was on its intended
beneficiaries, the 'workers.'").
131. 29 U.S.C. § 1001(a) (2000).
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Compensation or Windfall?

Recalling the facts in Knudson, a healthy Janette Knudson was
rendered quadriplegic by a car accident. The ERISA plan and its
insurer paid $411,157.11 of her medical expenses. She recovered a
settlement from the tortfeasors in the amount of $650,000. Following
payment of attorney fees, costs, and partial reimbursements, Janette
Knudson was13 2to receive the benefit of $265,745.30 through a Special
Needs Trust.
The amicus curiae brief filed by several members of the health
insurance industry 33 asserted that the "lower court's holding ...
allows a few ERISA beneficiaries to be unjustly enriched at the expense
of their fellow plan beneficiaries." 1" The brief also argued that the
lower court's decision resulted in a "windfall to one plan member [which]
must inexorably come out of the pockets of the rest."'35
Has Janette Knudson been unjustly enriched? Has she secured a
windfall? Or, has she simply secured just compensation, albeit still less
than her actual damages, which she should be permitted to retain?
Thus lies the real crux of the reimbursement proposition. Is it a
"windfall" to allow this quadriplegic victim to keep her $265,745.30
Special Needs Trust? Should all of the net recovery be turned over to
the ERISA plan and its insurer? Do the interests of the ERISA plan and
its insurers outweigh the interests of the injured member who suffers a
catastrophic loss? At first blush, these may appear to be hard questions.
And, lying just beneath the surface of these questions are additional
questions: If reimbursement is permitted, will the recovered funds really
benefit the plan members? If so, to what extent? If reimbursement is
denied, will the plan still operate and provide continued benefits for plan
members?
Reflecting upon the situation in Knudson, only $75,000 was actually
spent by the ERISA plan. The remainder of the $411,157.11 was paid
by Great-West Life & Annuity Insurance Company. Accordingly, in the
event reimbursement had been permitted, the ERISA plan itself would
have actually received less than twenty percent of the amount reim-

132. 534 U.S. at 207.
133. Brief filed on behalf of The American Associations of Health Plans, The American
Benefits Council, The Blue Cross Blue Shield Association, The Chamber of Commerce of
the United States, and The Health Insurance Association of America. Brief of Amici
Curiae the American Associations of Health Plans et al., Knudson, 534 U.S. 204 (2002) (No.
99-1786).
134. Id. at 11.
135. Id. at 16.
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bursed, with the remainder going to the commercial insurer, which had
agreed to assume the risk for catastrophic losses.
A considerable sum of money is at stake in the ultimate resolution of
the reimbursement issue. In Knudson the Supreme Court was told that
"[m]illions and potentially billions of dollars are recouped annually by
health plans and insurers by virtue of subrogation and other recovery
mechanisms."" 6 This creates yet another problem for the insured plan
member. As the efforts to seek subrogation and reimbursement for
medical expense claims has grown, so too has the development of private
collection firms,'3 7 which seek recovery of these dollars through
assignments from the ERISA plan and their insurers.' 38 Certainly this
industry provides employment to many people, as do the private
subrogation departments of existing insurers and ERISA plans. But, is
this what society desires? Does society want to provide jobs for bill
collectors that are funded by tort recoveries of innocent victims who have
suffered catastrophic losses? Now that these bill-collecting entities have
been established, they become additional sources of lobby influence in
our legislatures and additional sources of input to courts in their judicial
decision-making capacity, promoting their own self-interest." 9
The spawning of bill collectors and "aggressive" collection efforts
necessarily creates additional burdens for the plan members who become
victims. For example, when reimbursement is sought by some health
care plans and their collection agencies, it is sometimes sought for
amounts greater than the actual cost expended for the insured.)" In
one case in West Virginia, the insured's health plan sought $128,000
reimbursement for medical expenses for a ten-year-old boy who was hit
while on his bike. The boy and his parents had secured $950,000 from
the tortfeasor and their underinsurance coverage. It was discovered that
the actual amount paid by the health plan was far less than the claimed

136. Id. at 10. "During fiscal year 2000, Healthcare Recoveries, Inc., one of the largest
private health care claims recovery services in the United States, recovered $237.3 million
in health claims, and had a backlog of over $1.1 billion of potentially recoverable
claims... ." Id. n.20.
137. Health Care Recoveries, Inc. is described as the largest private collection firm.

Id. at 10.
138. There are numerous cases cited in this Article that involve Primax Recoveries,
Inc., another such collection entity. E.g., Primax Recoveries, Inc. v. Sevilla, 324 F.3d 544
(7th Cir. 2003).
139. See Brief of Amicus Nat'l Ass'n of Subrogation Professionals, Inc., Knudson, 534
U.S. 204 (2002) (No. 99-1786).
140. Michelle Andrews, Adding Insult to Injury, SMART MONEY MAG., July 2000, at 130.
("It's one thing for a health plan or hospital to get reimbursed for its costs. It's quite
another for it to seek money it never paid out. Yet that's what some managed-care
companies are doing with subrogation." Id. at 134.).
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amount of $128,000.141 The actual expenses paid by the HMO ran
from $70,000 to $100,000.142 The HMO sued the victim and his family
for the claimed amount of $128,000.'4
In response to the suit, the
family filed a counterclaim which was "expanded into a class action on
144
behalf of 3,500 other patients billed for reimbursement at full rates."
The case was eventually settled, 145 but a quote by the young boy's
attorney is memorable: "If you have a devastating injury like this, the
last thing you expect is the HMO comes back and says all that
(premium) payment doesn't matter, and you have to pay us. They sued
a paralyzed child."'46
Aside from individual cases prosecuted by individual attorneys, no
ongoing organized group 14 or other voice for victims exists in the
public debate on reimbursement. The affected plan members who suffer
catastrophic losses are not identified until the catastrophe occurs. Then,
each victim stands alone in his or her situation.
Returning to the question of whether quadriplegic Janette Knudson
secured a windfall when the Court left her Special Needs Trust intact,
obviously there was no windfall. Equally obvious, Janette Knudson will

141. Id.
Since she worked in the business office of a doctors' practice, Susan DeGarmo [the
victim's mother] was familiar with subrogation. Still, the $128,000 that the HMO,
the Health Plan of the Upper Ohio Valley, was demanding seemed high to her.
So she did some research. She called the hospital in Columbus, Ohio, where
Stephen had been treated, and got an itemized list of charges. What she
discovered infuriated her. The HMO had paid much less than the $128,000 it now
was seeking.
Id.
142. Id.
Then DeGarmo's HMO, Health Plan of the Upper Ohio Valley, sued the family to
recover $128,000 for Stephen's care. DeGarmo's lawyer, Don Kresen, found
documents that he says showed that the HMO paid less to treat Stephen. Kresen
estimates that the HMO spent $70,000; the HMO says the figure was more than
$100,000.
William M. Welch, HMOs Exercising Right to Sue Patients,USA TODAY, July 19, 2001, at
11A.
143.
144.

Id.
Id.

145. Id. "The health plan settled for $9 million. Last month, a federal judge approved
another $3 million settlement by the health plan's collection agency." Id.
146.

Id.

147. Brief of Amici Curiae Maryland HMO Subrogation Plaintiffs, Knudson, 534 U.S.
204 (2002) (No. 99-1786). Groups may be formed for the purpose of litigation, but such
groups do not exist on an ongoing basis, leaving the plights of the victims collectively
unrepresented in decision-making forums of this country. E.g., Maryland Subrogation
HMO Plaintiffs who filed an Amicus Brief in Knudson, 2001 WL 740868 (S. Ct. June 29,
2001) (U.S. Amicus Brief).
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live the rest of her life as a quadriplegic, and she will never be made
whole. She will always remain grossly undercompensated for her
injuries.
Given that ERISA plans' asserted rights of reimbursement have been
largely upheld in circuits other than the Ninth Circuit prior to Knudson,
there have been numerous situations in which a plan member has
suffered a catastrophic loss and has been left with no money, despite
recovering a monetary settlement from the tortfeasor.'" ERISA plans
and their insurers do not pursue a rule of reason. They pursue a rule
of absoluteness-they seek reimbursement without regard to the
situation of the plan member.'4 9
The windfall argument fails. Ample authority supports the proposition that it is the insurer itself that receives a windfall through
subrogation.' 0 This would be especially true with respect to commer148. E.g., In re Paris, 44 F. Supp. 2d 747 (D. Md. 1999) (Entire recovery of $100,000
from tortfeasor's insurer went to pay legal fees, costs, and partial reimbursement of ERISA
plan. "The practical result of the court's decision was that the remainder of the $100,000
settlement... was to be paid to the Fund while Ms. Paris and her adult, destitute child
were left with nothing other than the remainder of the Fund bill debt and years of future
financial challenges." David M. Kono, Unraveling the Lining of ERISA Health Insurer
Pockets-A Vote for National FederalCommon Law Adoption of the Make Whole Doctrine,
2000 B.Y.U. L. REV. 427, 436 (2000)); In re Estate of Scott, 567 N.E.2d 605 (Ill. 1991)
(ERISA plan that had paid $200,000 in medical expenses allowed to recover entire balance
of settlement ($82,000) recovered from tortfeasor following payment of court-approved fees,
leaving nothing for plan beneficiary who was seriously injured while riding as a passenger
on a motorcycle).
The current state of subrogation law ... works to disadvantage injured persons
....
In many cases, insurers who were paid to assume the risk of loss are
themselves made whole by subrogation while their insureds are not made whole.
This is inequitable since the insurer has agreed to assume the risk of nonrecovery,
and has been paid for this.
Keith E. Edeus, Subrogation of PersonalInjury Claims: Toward Ending an Inequitable
Practice,17 N. ILL. U. L. REV. 509, 526 (1997) (reviewing In re Estate of Scott, 567 N.E.2d
605 (Ill. 1991)).
149. In pursuing this absolute rule, the Health Insurance Industry brief rather
audaciously suggests, "Should the Ninth Circuit believe that it is helping individual plan
participants or beneficiaries retain additional monies by invalidating reimbursement
clauses, it could not be more wrong. In fact, a plan's enforcement of its reimbursement
clause simultaneously serves the interest of both the plan and the beneficiary." Brief of
Amici Curiae The American Association of Health Plans et al. at 15, Knudson, 534 U.S. 204
(2002) (No. 99-1786).
150. DeCespedes v. Prudence Mut. Cas. Co., 193 So. 2d 224, 227-28 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1967) (admitting that "subrogation has been a two-edged sword" frequently resulting in a
windfall to insurers because "anticipated recoveries under subrogation rights are generally
not reflected in the computation of premium rates").
"Subrogation is a windfall to the insurer. It plays no part in rate schedules." EDWIN W.
PA"'ERSON, EssENTIALs OF INSURANCE LAW § 33, at 151 (2d ed. 1957).
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cial insurers.' 5 ' Additionally, the whole idea of a windfall or "double
recovery" was developed within the historical beginnings of subrogation
and that beginning lies exclusively within the realm of property
-insurance.'5 2 In a property insurance context, the numbers are fixed,
and the insured rarely runs the risk of not being fully compensated.' 5'
Subrogation is far more logical in a property insurance setting. For
example, if a $30,000 building is destroyed by fire by a tortfeasor, the
insurer pays the insured $30,000 and then is permitted to pursue the
tortfeasor for $30,000 on a subrogation claim. There is no dispute over
the damage and how much the insured needs to be made whole.
Subrogation on property insurance claims has been relatively easy and
efficient. Additionally, subrogation was a better alternative than
allowing the tortfeasor to have the benefit of the victim's wisdom (and
premium payment) in securing an insurance policy."M This idea of not
letting the tortfeasor enjoy the benefit of the victim's insurance is
"'
known, of course, as the "collateral source" rule. 55
The original justification for allowing subrogation traces back to two
ideas: First, the tortfeasor should not get the benefit of the insurance
(the collateral source rule); and second, if the insured is also permitted

"A possible third reason, that of ultimately reducing insurance rates by virtue of
subrogated recoveries by insurers, has simply not come to pass. Insurers consistently fail
to introduce the factor of such recoveries into rate-determining formulae, but rather apply
recoveries to increasing dividends to shareholders." JOHN F. DOBBYN, INSURANCE LAW IN
A NUTSHELL 284 (3d ed. 1996).
"On the other hand, if an insurer is allowed to subrogate and recover the money it paid
its insured on the claim, then it finds itself in the position of having suffered no loss.
Additionally, the insurer retains the premium initially charged to cover that risk." Baron,
A Pandora'sBox, supra note 36, at 243.
151. Id. at 245; Baron, Subrogationon Medical Expense Claims, supra note 38, at 58687.
152. Baron, supra note 38, at 583; Baron, A Pandora'sBox, supra note 36, at 238 nn.
7-10; JOHN ALAN APPLEMAN & JEAN APPLEMAN, INSURANCE LAW AND PRACTICE § 1675
(1967).
153. Subrogation can also be unfair to the insured in a property insurance setting. See,
e.g., Wimberly v. Am. Cas. Co., 584 S.W.2d 200 (Tenn. 1979) (adopting the "make whole"
doctrine in property insurance case when insurance coverage was $15,000 on total loss of
$44,619.10 and insured settled with tortfeasor's insurer for $25,000, still yielding a total
recovery to insured of only $40,000).
154. This idea is, of course, known as the "collateral source" rule-the notion that a
tortfeasor should not be permitted to lessen his obligation simply because the victim has
received a payment from a collateral source. The "collateral source" rule was recognized
by the Supreme Court in PropellerMonticello v. Mollison, 58 U.S. 152 (1854).
155. Id. See also Calvin R. Wright, The Collateral Source Rule in Georgia: A New
Method of Equal ProtectionAnalysis Brings a Return to the Old Common Law Rule, 8 GA.
ST. U. L. REv. 835 (1992); and Baron, A Pandora'sBox, supra note 36, at 242 n.35 and
accompanying text.
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to collect from the tortfeasor (in addition to receiving the insurance
proceeds), the insured would secure a double recovery or windfall. 5 '
The fundamental reasoning for this second idea has itself been shown to
be questionable. 157 However, even if one accepts this second idea as
a "given" in the world of property insurance, one will soon find that its
logic does not extend into the world of medical expense claims and the
possibility of subrogation or reimbursement vis & vis personal injury
claims. Losing an item of property valued at $30,000 is much different
than suffering a personal injury.'
In a personal injury situation,
damages may involve permanent disability, mental anguish, physical
pain, loss of income, and future aspects of each of these components.
Computation of the total loss is more complicated than in a property
damage situation. In addition to the fact that computation of the loss
is not easily determinable, the recoveries actually secured by the victim
against the tortfeasor rarely amount to full compensation. Factors
frequently come into play which make it reasonable and appropriate for
the victim to accept less than the total loss in settlement.'59 These
settlements are for less than the actual damages for a number of
reasons: (1) the liability of the tortfeasor is disputed and uncertain, (2)
there may be an assertion of contributory negligence or comparative
fault on the part of the victim, or (3) the tortfeasor has limited assets or

156. A fundamental flaw with this logic is that the insurer itself ends up with a
windfall because, in the end, it is relieved of its obligation to pay on a claim that it
accepted a premium to cover. Additionally, the argument can be made that the insured's
right to recover against the insurer is premised upon contract, and the insured's right to
recover (again) against the tortfeasor is premised upon tort. As such the insured has two
separate rights and causes of action, as compared to the uninsured victim who would only
have a cause of action against the tortfeasor. The underlying distinction is that the
premium assures the insured a cause of action against the insurer. See Baron, A Pandora's
Box, supra note 36, at 241-42 nn.29-37.
157. Id.
158.
A number of courts have recognized that prohibiting subrogation does not result
in a "double recovery" by the insured. A "double recovery" in favor of the insured
is unlikely to arise due to the fact that the "exact loss" suffered by the insured is
often impossible to accurately ascertain. This is particularly apparent when
factors such as mental anguish and physical pain are considered. Also, the
amount of the settlement agreed upon is often going to "be less than actual
damages," particularly when the liability of the tortfeasor is disputable, "or
because the tortfeasor has limited assets or limited insurance coverage." Lastly,
after attorney fees are considered, the insured is left with a substantially reduced
recovery.
Pickar, supra note 94, at 326.
159. Baron, A Pandora'sBox, supra note 36, at 245.
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limited insurance coverage. 6 ' Additionally, the applicable law may
not permit recovery of certain elements of damage, such as the future
aspect of certain damages. 6 ' On top of these considerations, when a
settlement is finally secured, the victim will most likely receive only twothirds of the settlement16or
less, depending upon payment of attorney fees
2
and costs of litigation.

Given the intrusive and unfair nature of subrogation in the area of
personal injury claims, not surprisingly at least one state supreme court
has declared statutory provisions permitting such subrogation to be
One might well expect to see future challenges
unconstitutional.'
upon constitutional grounds as to reimbursement and subrogation in the
area of personal injury claims."
The most logical response to the windfall argument is a simple and
well-supported proposition: Reimbursement will be permitted only after
the plan member has been made whole. If the plan member has not
been fully compensated for his or her loss, then reimbursement should
be denied. If the plan member has been fully compensated, then the
plan may seek reimbursement against that amount which exceeds full
compensation. The "make whole" doctrine is well-recognized in the state
courts of this country. 6 '
Many, but not all, federal courts have also acknowledged the
appropriateness of the make whole doctrine, as a matter of federal

160. Id.
161. Id.
162. Id. at 250-52 nn.81-85 and accompanying text. See also Allstate Ins. Co. v. Reitler,
628 P.2d 667, 670 (Mont. 1981) (discussing how expense, including cost of litigation, limits
ultimate recovery).
163. Holeton v. Crouse Cartage Co., 748 N.E.2d 1111 (Ohio 2001) (holding that statute
permitting subrogation for worker compensation benefits violated provisions of the Ohio
state constitution).
164. See Denton v. Con-Way S. Express, Inc., 402 S.E.2d 269 (Ga. 1991) (holding
statute, which abrogated the "collateral source" rule in Georgia civil cases, unconstitutional
on the basis of the Georgia state constitution). See also James L. Branton, The Collateral
Source Rule, 18 ST. MARY'S L.J. 883,888 nn.29-31 and accompanying text (1987) (reviewing
cases involving constitutional challenges to statutes abolishing the collateral source rule).
165. Baron, A Pandora'sBox, supra note 36, at 91.
Perhaps the most attractive of the intermediate doctrines is the "make whole"
doctrine. Under this doctrine, subrogation is permitted only after the insured has
been fully compensated or "made whole." This approach acknowledges the
realistic nature of tort recoveries and rejects the blind assertion that subrogation
is necessary in order to prevent the insured from realizing a "double recovery
...." It was recently reported that the "make whole" doctrine now serves as the
majority view, having been adopted in twenty-five jurisdictions.
Id. at 245-50 (internal citations omitted).
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common law,"' in reimbursement cases.'67 This country, its employees, and their beneficiaries would be well-served if all of its courts
adopted and enforced the make whole doctrine in all reimbursement
cases, irrespective of language in plan documents to the contrary. Such
has already been urged."
D. Rates
The health insurance industry asserts that the denial of reimbursement "necessarily drains plan funds."6 9 The industry also claims that
"[i]nsurance companies and employee health benefit plans base rates and
benefit levels on actuarial determinations that factor in the effect of
subrogation and reimbursement provision recoveries." 7 °

166. Gerald F. Murphy, Subrogationor Subterfuge: The Myth ofERISA Health Benefit
Plans, 19 J. CoNTEMP. HEALTH L. & POLy 309, 314-18 (2002) (reviewing the existing
federal court decisions on the "make whole" doctrine). "Generally put, the Sixth, Ninth and
Eleventh Circuits have adopted the ['make whole' doctrine] as a 'default' rule, while the
remaining courts have either refused to apply the rule at all, or have at least declined to
do so thus far." Id.
For one of the more recent references to this matter, see UnicareLife & Health Insurance
Co. v. Saiter, 276 Fed. Appx. 171 (6th Cir. 2002) wherein the trial court had applied the
federal common law "make whole" doctrine and denied the claim for reimbursement when
the plan beneficiary had received only $100,000 in settlement, and the ERISA plan had
paid $164,000 in benefits, recognizing that her total damages "undisputedly approaches
$500,000." Id. at *173.
167. There is also authority for the proposition that there is a "federal common fund
doctrine," which would help ameliorate the harshness of reimbursement in many cases.
In Varco the court stated that
the federal common fund doctrine which is similar to, but not identical in
application to the Illinois doctrine, has existed independently in the federal system
since 1882 .... Although primarily used only in situations involving class action
law suits, federal courts have interpreted the doctrine to apply in single-party
ERISA disputes despite the absence in the suit of the affected attorney.
338 F.3d at 691 (internal citations omitted).
168.
A nationwide adoption of the make whole doctrine deals most equitably with the
health insurer, the injured insured, and the third-party tortfeasor .... In light
of the highly questionable rationale for the existence of health insurer subrogation,
the lack of guidance from ERISA itself, and the windfall for health insurers at the
expense of its own insured, adoption of the make whole doctrine on a federal level
will insure that all interested parties receive equitable treatment.
Kono, supra note 111, at 449-50.
169. Brief filed on behalf of The American Association of Health Plans, The American
Benefits Council, The Blue Cross Blue Shield Association, The Chamber of Commerce of
the United States, and the Health Insurance Association of America (may be collectively
referred to as "Health Care Industry" in text). Brief of Amici Curiae The American
Association of Health Plans et al. at 11, Knudson, 534 U.S. 204 (2002) (No. 99-1786).
170. Id.
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Historically, subrogated recoveries are not reflected 171 in the setting
172
of rates.
This is especially true with respect to commercial insur1 73
ers.

When one considers the nature of the insurance provided by ERISA
plans, it becomes apparent that subrogated recoveries have less
likelihood of impacting premium rates than the industry suggests. For
example, when a plan beneficiary is seriously injured incurring medical
bills of $200,000, the plan will be required to pay the bills, regardless of
how the beneficiary is injured. If the beneficiary was struck by
lightning, the plan will have to pay the $200,000 in bills. If the
beneficiary was injured in a tornado or earthquake, the plan will have
to pay the $200,000 in bills. If the beneficiary was involved in a one-car
accident in which the beneficiary was negligent, the plan will have to
pay the $200,000 in bills. If the beneficiary was in a multi-car collision
and also primarily at fault, the plan will have to pay the $200,000 in
bills. If the beneficiary was not at fault and was injured by a tortfeasor
with no assets and with no applicable insurance, the plan will have to
pay the $200,000 in bills. If the beneficiary suffers from a disease or
ailment, the plan will have to pay the $200,000 in bills. In each of these

171. Pickar, supra note 94, at 338.
It has been argued that insurance companies who collect on subrogated recoveries
will in turn lower their premium, but this has yet to happen. In the determination of insurance premiums, many factors are considered, but successful recoveries
of subrogated claims are not one of them. When an insurer recovers under the
right of subrogation, it has basically reinsured itself, and thus has suffered no loss,
i.e., it has received a windfall, the very thing subrogation was created to prevent.
Id.
172. See generally supra note 150; Maxwell v. Allstate Ins. Co., 728 P.2d 812, 815 (Nev.
1986) ("Allowing subrogation deprives the insured of the coverage for which he had paid
and results in a windfall recovery for the insurer."); see also Kono, supra note 111, at 44647 (discussing "'insurance savings' myth").
In paying the loss, the insurer simply pays an anticipated loss on a risk that has
been actuarially distributed over a pool of similarly-situated insureds. The setting
of the insurance premium for the transfer of the risk from the insured to the
insurer encompasses the insured's pro rat share of the total estimated losses for
the pool, as well as the insured's pro rata share of the costs, expenses, and profit
margin to be borne by the insurer for setting up and administering the insurance
undertaking. The prospect of a successful subrogation collection is not a factor in
the insurer's rate determination. In fact, the conjectural and remote nature of
subrogation militates against its inclusion as a factor for consideration in the
setting of premium rates. Thus, when an insurer pays out on an insured risk, any
recovery that the insurer is able to obtain through subsequent subrogation is a
windfall to the insurer.
Baron, A Pandora'sBox, supra note 36, at 244.
173. Id. at 245; Baron, Subrogationon MedicalExpense Claims,supra note 38, at 58687.
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cases, the obligation to pay medical bills exists-such is the nature of
the insurance provided. But, even assuming that the right of reimbursement or subrogation is permitted, there would be no subrogated recovery
in any of these scenarios because either the plan beneficiary lacks a
viable cause of action against a tortfeasor, or there is no source of funds
available for settlement. Yet, the obligation to insure continues.
The foregoing examples illustrate the obligation of the insurer and its
need to establish rates and premiums, which are based on the probability of medical need for everyone in the pool, regardless of the cause of
injury. On an actuarial basis, whether the insured was injured by his
own fault or by the fault of a tortfeasor or by an act of God creates no
distinction. The obligation persists for the insurer to pay the medical
bills without regard to cause of injury.' 4 True enough, in some cases
the injury is inflicted by a tortfeasor, from whom a monetary settlement
may be attained. But, from the standpoint of actuarial prediction, such
an occurrence is speculative at best. What is important, from an
actuarial basis, is the overall incidence of loss. Stated differently, the
insurers must actuarially look at the overall incidence of loss for the
purpose of setting rates, not the incidence of loss "for all plan members
except those who have an "injury
caused by a tortfeasor against whom
17 5
lies a subrogated recovery. '
This same pattern exists with respect to property insurance, wherein
lies the origin of subrogation. If a $30,000 house burns down, the
insurer of the house is required to pay the $30,000 to the insured
regardless of whether the fire was started by lightning or by a tortfeasor.
Actuarially, the property insurers look at the incidence of fire loss for
the purpose of setting rates, not "fire loss caused by anything other than
a tortfeasor with assets."' 6 Thus, the nature of subrogation as it

174. The plan in the case of Bauhaus USA, Inc. v. Copeland, 292 F.3d 439 (5th Cir.
2002), purported to do otherwise. See infra note 175.
175. The plan in the case of Bauhaus USA, purported to do exactly this and then
agreed to "advance" medical expenses when an injury took place. 292 F.3d at 440.
"Although the Plan did not cover injuries resulting from the acts of another, the Plan
honored Copeland's request for benefits and elected to advance payments for... medical
expenses in the amount of $46,229.45." Id. (quoting provisions of plan document).
Apparently this provision was designed to avoid the application of Mississippi's antiassignment law. Id. at 441.
176. Compare Wimberly v. Am. Cas. Co., 584 S.W.2d 200 (Tenn. 1979).
Finally, although defendant insurers must pay the full limits of their policies
without reimbursement by way of subrogation, the insured loss was a risk that the
insureds paid for them to assume. Had the tortfeasor been judgment-proof and
uninsured, defendants would still have been required to bear the loss to the full
extent of the policies.
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relates to premium rate setting is too speculative to be "planned on," yet
the overall incidence of loss is, indeed, "planned for" on an actuarial
basis.
The concession must be made that an insuring entity (whether an
ERISA plan or a commercial insurer) that receives substantial subrogated recoveries into its coffer will be financially healthier than one that
lacks those recoveries. Any additional revenue, from any source, helps
an insurer become financially healthier. Similarly, an insurer, which
has set aside substantial reserves for claims, gains a financial boon if
and when the claims are favorably adjudicated, and it is not required to
pay out those reserves that had been set aside. The unused reserves
may now be brought back into general revenue for the insurer, and it is
healthier. But, simply because an insurer has the opportunity to recover
reserves and become financially healthy, this opportunity does not
directly translate into premium reductions.
The concession that if the decision is made to deprive subrogation or
reimbursement recoveries from any insuring entity, that entity will
receive less overall revenue is also recognized. Additionally, it is
conceded that a decline of revenue for the entity will have an impact to
some degree on its operation. That degree of impact becomes an
important matter. The decision concerning approval or denial of
reimbursement should also be informed by the ramifications on both
sides of the question. The ERISA plans and insurers are quick to point
out that they may be drained of funds, but they fail to mention the
impact on the plan member. In many of these cases, the plan member
is not only seriously injured as a result of the catastrophic event, but is
also left financially destitute when reimbursement is permitted. What
is the choice to be? Permit the ERISA plans and insurers to have this

Id. at 203-04 (adopting the "make whole" doctrine in property insurance case where
insurance coverage was $15,000 on total loss of $44,619.10 and insured settled with
tortfeasor's insurer for $25,000, still yielding a total recovery to insured of only $40,000).
" [Insurance companies expect to pay their insureds for negligently caused fire,
and they adjust their rates accordingly. In this context, an insurer should not be
allowed to treat a tenant, who is in privity with the insured landlord, as a
negligent third party when it could not collect against its own insured had the
insured negligently caused the fire" . . . . It occurs to us that if the reasoning
underlying the denial of a subrogation claim applies between a landlord and a
tenant, then we conclude that this reason is even more compelling when the
relationship is that of host and guest, particularly when the host has assured the
guest that there is insurance coverage.
Reeder v. Reeder, 348 N.W.2d 832, 837 (Neb. 1984) (quoting the Washington Court of
Appeals opinion in Rizzuto v. Morris, 592 P.2d 688, 690 (Wash. Ct. App. 1979)).
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billion dollar per year177 supplemental income while plan members are
left devastated both physically and financially? Allow the victims to
attempt to be fully compensated, while requiring the plans and insurers
to stand behind their commitment to render insurance for the plan
members?
In resolving the rate issue and in also resolving the entire reimbursement issue, perhaps the most relevant approach is to look back and to
reflect upon the commodity or service being provided. What is it that
ERISA plans are providing? Is it health insurance coverage? Is it
something less than health insurance coverage? If indeed the plan is
providing health insurance coverage, then the allowance of reimbursement indeed negates that coverage. The plan beneficiary who believes
he or she has health insurance coverage will eventually learn that the
coverage is "illusory"'7 8 if and when the member suffers a catastrophic
loss.
IV.

CONSTITUTIONAL DIMENSION

When one considers the plight of the victims of catastrophic injury and
the effect of reimbursement on those victims, words become inadequate
in describing the consequences. As the ERISA plans and insurers
aggressively pursue and seize any possible hope for financial security
that these victims may have, the results are incomprehensible.' 9
In the vast majority of such cases, due to liability insurance policy
limits or lack of resources, these victims will never recover from the

177. Brief of Amici Curiae The American Association of Health Plans et al. at 10,
Knudson, 534 U.S. 204 (2002) (No. 99-1786). "Millions and potentially billions of dollars
are recouped annually by health plans and insurers by virtue of subrogation and other
recovery mechanisms." Id. "During fiscal year 2000, Healthcare Recoveries, Inc., one of
the largest private health care claims recovery services in the United States, recovered
$237.3 million in health claims, and had a backlog of over $1.1 billion of potentially
recoverable claims . . . ." Id.
178. Baron, Subrogation on Medical Expense Claims, supra note 38, at 588.
Subrogation on non-property damage claims renders insurance coverage "illusory"
because the insured receives nothing for the separate premium paid to the insurer
when a tortfeasor is liable for damages. The "illusory" nature of first party
medical payments coverage in an automobile policy is even more apparent in those
jurisdictions that statutorily require every driver of an automobile to be covered
by liability insurance or other proof of financial responsibility.

Id.
179. These concerns are explored in a well-documented article published in a magazine
of national circulation. Appropriately, the title to the article is "Adding Insult to Injury."
Michelle Andrews, Adding Insult to Injury, SMART MONEY MAG., July 2000, at 134.
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tortfeasor a settlement which fully compensates them for their damages.'
Then, after payment of attorney fees and costs, the victims
actually receive two-thirds or less of that settlement. But, if allowed to
keep this settlement, they would at least have something to help them
deal with the heavy financial burden awaiting them in life. No mercy
is shown for the victim in the reimbursement provisions utilized by
ERISA plans. Absolutely no protection exists for the victim's right to be
compensated for injuries.
Constitutional challenges to subrogation and reimbursement on
personal injury claims have been successful on the basis of individual
state constitutional provisions. 18' It is reasonable to expect additional
challenges to surface, with the victims urging that they are being
deprived of "liberty, or property, without due process of law."182 These
victims surely have a liberty or property interest, which merits
protection. The unilateral nature in which the ERISA plans create and
enforce their rights of reimbursement certainly fails to afford any due
process to the plan members.
To the extent that state action may be attributed to the insurers
seeking such deprivation, application of the Fourteenth Amendment of
the United States Constitution will be triggered. 8' In situations of
direct federal involvement, such as that seen in the federally protected
ERISA plans themselves, application of the Fifth Amendment Due
Process Clause may be invoked.M
In the meantime, our courts may eschew the inevitable constitutional
confrontation through denial of reimbursement on technical grounds
such as that witnessed in Knudson. Courts may also avoid the
constitutional clash through renewed and continued application of the
make whole doctrine by operation of federal common law. Lastly and,
perhaps most appropriately, courts may choose simply to recognize that
reimbursement efforts by ERISA plans are unlawful because they violate
public policy.

180. In this regard, could "any amount of money" fully compensate Janette Knudson,
who has been rendered quadriplegic?
181. Denton v. Conway Express, Inc., 402 S.E.2d 269 (Ga. 1991); Holeton v. Crouse
Cartage Co., 748 N.E.2d 1111 (Ohio 2001).
182. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
183. Id.
184. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
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CONCLUSION

The ERISA scheme exists to facilitate benefit plans for employees and
their beneficiaries. 8 5 Congress has declared that an equitable character of these plans be assured in the interest of the employees and their
beneficiaries.' 8 6 The concept of reimbursement or subrogation for
medical expense claims has no support in ERISA's statutory scheme. It
exists because it has been unilaterally implanted in plan documents.' 87
For certain plan members, the utilization of reimbursement has the
effect of completely nullifying the coverage afforded under the plan.
Unfortunately, this happens mainly in situations in which the plan
beneficiary has encountered serious and debilitating physical injuries.
Although there is some rationale for reimbursement, in that it does
provide revenue for a plan and its insurers, the corresponding detriment
is far too significant to permit its continued usage. The underlying
concept of subrogation in the field of personal injury claims is problematic and has caused not only much litigation, but also tremendous
hardship on insureds. The extension of this concept, through the tool of
reimbursement, is especially burdensome on this nation's employees and
their beneficiaries-the very subjects intended to be protected by
Congress when it enacted the ERISA scheme in 1974.
Due to an absence of oversight mechanisms and the preemptive nature
of ERISA, there have been many judicial decisions which have the result
of allowing these hardships to continue at the insistence of plan
administrators. With the recent decision by the Supreme Court in
Knudson, which denies a federal remedy to plans seeking reimbursement, 188 there now exists the opportunity to reflect upon the true
merits of reimbursement. In so reflecting, one must conclude the
allowance of unqualified reimbursement was wrong to begin with, and
it is wrong today. It is not supported historically. It is not supported by
federal statute. Lastly, it is not supported by any consideration of equity
or fairness.

185. 29 U.S.C. § 1001 (2000).
186. 29 U.S.C. § 1001(a) (2000) ("[Tlhat it is therefore desirable in the interests of
employees and their beneficiaries... that minimum standards be provided as assuring the
equitable character of such plans. .. ").
187. As noted by Freedman, "'[T]he doctrine of subrogation was conceived unilaterally,
nurtured unilaterally, and cast upon the courts for the unilateral interest of insurers
generally. It must be thoroughly reexamined from time to time.'" Pickar, supra note 94,
at 338 (quoting WARREN FREEDMAN, FREEDMAN'S RICHARDS ON INSURANCE 360 (6th ed.
1990)).
188. 534 U.S. at 221.
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In many situations the enforcement of reimbursement provisions
amounts to a complete deprivation of a victim's right to be compensated
for injuries. As such, reimbursement may work an unconstitutional
deprivation of liberty and property without due process of law.
Society, as a whole, would benefit from the elimination of the
reimbursement effort. Hundreds of thousands of this nation's employees
and their beneficiaries are at risk of being rendered destitute by this
arbitrary rule of reimbursement, a rule which is designed to enhance
revenues primarily for the commercial insurers who agree to assume
part of the risk undertaken by ERISA plans.
The result of the Supreme Court's ruling in Knudson is indeed the
right result, but it is supported by far more than simple statutory
interpretation. The time has come for our courts to address the
reimbursement issue head on. Unless eliminated or moderated by the
make whole doctrine, reimbursement remains a tyrannical oppression
upon our nation's employees and their beneficiaries-those whom
Congress intended to protect through the enactment of ERISA.

